With the return of the parties to the ceasefire, Hamas` interests now lie in a rapid relief from the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The movement cannot be seen as an appeasement of dissent without securing profits: it must be able to demonstrate the price it has drawn from Israel, especially given the number of deaths and injuries that Israel has made among the demonstrators since 30 March. In the face of the Israeli covert operation, it is more imperative to show benefits. By continuing to protest at the borders of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has made it clear that it has no guarantee that it will not degenerate if Israel does not comply with its obligations under the agreement. While several projects purported to be the ceasefire agreement circulated in local media, Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders stressed that the Great March of Return would continue until the end of 2018 with “new tactics”. The leaders said that these tactics, which include Hamas` commitment to the ceasefire and ensure that no weapons are used against Israel and that no attempt to break down the barrier is underway, have been put in place to protect protesters and limit the loss of life in Gaza. This initial period of reflection naturally coincides with the winter season, during which the protests should calm down anyway. Hamas intends to use this time to test Israel`s willingness to fulfil its obligations. Otherwise, Hamas could encourage the protests to be revived by spring or summer 2019.
[fn] Interview with the Hamas crisis group, Gaza City, October 2018.Hamas said the June 19 agreement required an end to rocket fire on Israel in exchange for an end to the blockade.  According to the New York Times, the latest cross-border missile attack after which Israel paid tribute with airstrikes took place on 15 September and coincided with the signing of normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in Washington. Beyond the novelty of the Great March of Return, a dynamic of tit-for-act skirmishes has emerged between the two parties since 2007. Hamas is pressuring Israel through various means, including rockets, to ease restrictions on access to the Gaza Strip. Israel, for its part, is using the blockade and its military might to force Hamas to “calm down” to ensure that villages in the southern periphery of the Gaza Strip do not suffer disruptions in daily life. [fn] Tareq Baconi, “The status quo unlikely to change Gaza,” Palestine Square, October 22, 2018.Hamas, October 22, 2018, insists that there can be no respite without lifting the blockade, and sees no reason to hold back popular protests or rocket fire for the simple return to the misery that has long been going through Gaza. [fn] Interviews with the crisis group, former Hamas minister, Hamas spokesman, Hamas leader, Gaza City, June-July 2018.Hide Footnote What`s new? For the first time since the 2014 war, a long-term ceasefire plan between Hamas and Israel began in early November, which is expected to be disrupted by the biggest escalation in more than four years. The ceasefire has been restored, but it remains fragile.
In August and September 2020, the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations with Israel, so that they are only the third and fourth country in the region – after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 – to do so. The agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, came more than 18 months after the United States invited Israel and several Arab states to ministerial discussions in Warsaw, Poland, on the future of peace in the Middle East. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas rejected the recent agreements and recalled his ambassador from Abu Dhabi. Hamas also rejected the agreements. Like the reconstruction efforts to date, donors who write these projects (with the exception of Qatar, which continues to fund major infrastructure projects in Gaza while Hamas is in power) see the Palestinian Authority`s control over the Gaza Strip as a precondition for this latter phase.